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Abstract:
Purpose: Provide a coordination strategy using multiple common replenishment epochs (MCRE)
for a single-supplier multi-retailer supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach: The  demand  of  a  product  occurs  only  with  a  group  of
heterogeneous and independent retailers with constant rates, whereas all their order requests are
fulfilled by the supplier.  The supplier decides a set of  MCREs with general price and extra
bonus to entice the retailers to join any one of  the MCREs, or to let them remain with their
original order time epochs. A retailer is willing to participate in a CRE as long as the retailer’s
cost  increase  is  within  its  tolerance. This  paper  provides a  mixed integer  programming  to
determine the MCRE strategies in order to minimize the total costs of  the supplier.
Findings: The results illustrate that MCRE model provided in the paper can generate a better
replenishment coordination scheme than single CRE models.
Practical implications: Replenishment coordination is one of  the most important mechanisms to
improve the efficiency in  supply  chains,  e.g.,  chain convenience stores in  the modern retail
industry.
Originality/value: This is a follow-up research on Joint Economic Lot Size (JELS) models with a
focus on multiple retailers with their replenishment coordination.
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1. Introduction
To obtain competitive advantages, supply chain partners often seek coordination to improve
performance of the supply chain. As one of the most important supply chains in the modern
retail  industry, chain convenience stores have devoted significant efforts to improve supply
coordination. As of 2012, the three famous convenience store chains, 7-Eleven, FamilyMart,
and Couche-Tard,  operate around 43,000, 17,560 and 6,000 convenience stores worldwide
respectively (7-Eleven, 2012; FamilyMart, 2012; Alimentation Couche-Tard, 2012). The huge
and continuously growing number of stores in chain convenience stores creates a persistent
drive to improve their supply coordination. Often, a better coordination in the supply chain
supports  the  products  with  an  enhanced  competitive  advantage. In  practice,  the  retailing
industry with multiple stores would divide the distribution channels into various modules based
on  geographic  areas,  replenishment  epochs,  or  some  other  managerial  considerations  to
enhance logistic efficiency.
This paper studies a single-supplier, multiple-retailer supply chain for a single commodity. The
demand of the commodity occurs only at the retailers with constant rates, and the supplier is
responsible for replenishing all the retailers’ requests to satisfy their demands. The supplier is
the leader of the supply chain, and it provides a sequence of prescheduled epochs for all the
retailers to choose their order replenishment timings. The cost disadvantages of the retailers
for joining the replenishment timings shall be compensated by the supplier through quantity
discounts. In addition, the costs considered in the supply chain include  setup and delivery
costs of the supplier, as well as holding and ordering setup costs of the retailers. The objective
of the supply chain is to minimize the total cost of the supplier.
2. Literature review
The importance of coordination in the supply chain is evidenced by the ample growth in the
coordination  literature.  Fugate,  Sahin,  and  Mentzer  (2006)  summarize  the  benefits  of
coordination  including  cost  reduction,  risk  reduction,  profit  increase  and  competitive
advantages enhancement. Interested readers can refer to Goyal and Gupta (1989), Sarmah
Acharya and Goyal  (2006, 2008), Arshinder,  Kandaa and Deshmukh (2008),  Chan and Chan
(2010), and Chan (2011) for the review of the buyer-vendor coordination models.
Replenishment timing is one of the essential issues in inventory management. Heterogeneous
retailers  pursuing  their  own  optimizations  may  order  at  various  times.  Nevertheless,  the
variations on retailers’ replenishment timings significantly increase the cost of the supplier for
handling  these  replenishment  orders.  If  replenishment  orders  can  be  synchronized,  the
relevant inventory costs can be reduced. Hence, replenishment coordination is one of the areas
that research focuses on supply chain coordination, e.g.,  Yao and Chiou (2004), Chen and
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Chen  (2005),  Wu  and  Hwang  (2011).  In  order  to  provide  incentives  for  coordination,
mechanisms such as quantity discount, buy-back/return policies, and quantity flexibility are
often used (Tsay, Nahmias & Agrawal, 1999; Sarmah et al., 2006). However, quantity discount
is considered to be one of the most popular coordination mechanisms (Weng, 1995; Jorgensen
and Zaccour, 2003; Sarmah et al., 2006; Li & Wang, 2007).
Assume  the  supplier  has  all  the  relevant  information  about  the  retailer’s  replenishment
information,  Viswanathan and Piplani  (2001) first  propose a  CRE (Common Replenishment
Epoch) coordination model wherein the supplier offers a price discount as the compensation
and incentive for all buyers to participate in the coordination scheme. Under a CRE scheme, all
participating retailers release requests only at the supplier’s required CREs. Their model is
modified by Mishra (2004) with a selective discount policy in which some buyers are excluded
under the chosen CRE and discount. Mishra solves a two CRE problem with an algorithm by
segmenting buyers based on selective price discounts prior to assigning buyers into CREs.
Piplani and Viswanathan (2004) focus on saving joint order processing costs for the orders
placed by either one or both CREs at the same time. Feng and Viswanathan (2007) further
reveal  the effectiveness  of  coordinating supplier  and retailers  through a single CRE facing
uncertain demand. Yao and Chiou (2009) propose a cooperative model with a saving-sharing
mechanism  to  further  enhance  the  performance  of  the  supply  chain  within  a  single  CRE
consideration.
Note that Viswanathan and Piplani discuss a single CRE model, and Mishra studies a selective
discount model with a single CRE or two CREs. The work of Piplani and Viswanathan assumes a
dependent relationship between two CREs which seems restrictive in a practical sense. Our
paper adopts the framework of Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) and Mishra (2004) and extends
the model into a multiple CRE (MCRE) setting in which the multiple CREs are not dependent.
The implementation of a multiple CRE (MCRE) schemes of the supplier in this paper is based
on the frameworks of Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) and Mishra (2004). Nevertheless, our
research develops a general discount (GD) model such that the choice of MCRE to the retailers
is simply based on the criterion of minimizing the supplier’s total cost without pre-segmenting
buyers into either one of MCREs or none.
3. Model formulation and analysis
Now, we are in a position to analyze a single-supplier multi-retailer replenishment problem for
a retailing supply chain. In this section, we will first describe and analyze the problem of this
paper. In the subsequent subsections, the problem will be formulated into two MCRE models,
General Discount (GD) and Exact General Discount (EGD) MCRE. We name Mishra’s model as a
Selective Discount (SD) model. GD is defined as a more general model than SD model. The SD
will finally select a discount of a CRE based on the cost disadvantage of a retailer, and then any
retailers  have  to  join  the  CRE  if  and  only  if  the  following  condition  is  true:  a  retailer’s
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disadvantage of joining the CRE is able to compensate through the discount selected. This
condition is relaxed in the GD model such that every retailer is free to join a CRE as long as
the minimum total cost of the supplier can be reached. The second MCRE model defined in this
paper, EGD, is designed to remove redundancy of the joint order processing cost in the GD
model, cf. Piplani and Viswanathan (2004), with a broader definition.
3.1. Model description
Consider  a  supply  chain  in  which  a  supplier  sells  a  product  with  a  unit  price  P to  m
heterogeneous and self-governing retailers, where retailer i = 1,…,m has constant demand rate
λi, holding cost rate hi, and order setup cost Ki. In the system, the supplier is the leader and
considers  an MCRE scheme with all  the preferable  CREs in a set  X.  The MCRE scheme is
restricted to offer only  w CREs from  X for all the retailers to join. Thus,  Xw is defined as a
subset of X with w elements numbered as CRE j = 1,…,w. Each CRE j can be specified by the
time interval between two consecutive ordering occasions τj, i.e., Xw = {τ1,…,τw}. 
As long as a retailer participates in a CRE j scheme, the supplier offers incentives, including a
selling price discount  dj to compensate the retailer’s inventory cost increase, plus a bonus
100Sj measured as a fraction of the retailer’s original inventory cost. The price discount and
the bonus only pertain to the retailers selecting the CRE, regardless of any particular retailer to
avoid  price discrimination. The incentives offered by the supplier represent how much it is
willing to pay in order to achieve a better operational efficiency. At certain point of time, the
supplier processes an order from a retailer  i and incurs an order processing cost of  Ui if the
retailer  i does  not  participate  in  any  CRE.  Conversely,  the  supplier  incurs  a  joint  order
processing cost of AS for the entire MCRE orders with an additional cost of Aj dedicated for all
the orders of a CRE  j. In addition, the supplier incurs a delivery cost of  Di for every order
placed by the retailer  i. Under the MCRE scheme, a retailer is willing to select one of the
MCREs only if its inventory cost increase is below its limit of tolerance; otherwise, the retailer
will choose to stick with its original time epoch. The magnitudes of cost increase indicate the
retailer’s needs to adjust the changes. If the cost increases beyond the tolerance limit, some of
the managerial impact may not be easily adjusted, e.g., limitations on storage and facilities,
financial issues, human resources, and the product perishability, etc. Therefore, the retailer
will simply reject the CRE offer. This is the rationale to incorporate retailers’ tolerance limits in
the model.  The limit of tolerance of a retailer  i is denoted as a threshold  βi > 1, which is
defined as the ratio of its inventory cost after and before participating. The threshold signifies
the internal cost increase tolerance of the retailer, and is a criterion for the retailer to judge the
supplier’s MCRE offer. Once the retailer i participates in the CRE j, its order interval must follow
nijτj, where  nij is a positive integer. In case that the retailer  i selects its own order interval
rather than any CRE, a dummy CRE w+1 is denoted as the choice of the retailer not to join the
entire CREs in  Xw. Thus,  the decision of replenishment for a retailer  considers its internal
inventory cost increase as well  as external CRE incentives from the supplier.  The external
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incentives offered to the retailers by the supplier will be offset by the savings of the supplier’s
internal cost through the participations of the retailers in the MCRE. The supplier’s savings
results from  tradeoffs between internal order processing costs for the retailers’ joint orders
through the MCRE and the retailers’ original individual orders.
3.2. Model analysis
Before enacting an MCRE scheme, the optimal order interval of a retailer i is ti = √ 2Ki /hi λi P
with the inventory cost  gi = √ 2Kih i λi P  and the total  cost  Ti =  Pλi+gi. The supplier’s cost
includes an order and a delivery costs for each retailer, and then the total cost is given by
∑i=1
m
(U i+Di )/ ti . When an MCRE scheme is enacted, a retailer i selecting a CRE j will set its
replenishment interval  tij =  nijτj to minimize its  inventory cost  under the CRE. Hence,  the
inventory cost of the retailer i resulting from participating in the CRE j is gij = gi(ti/tij+tij/ti)/2
with the total cost  Tij = (1–dj)Pλi+gij. The optimal  nij, denoted as  nij*, such that  gij(nij*) is
minimized can be solved by using the inequality n ij
* (n ij
*−1 )≤2K i /hi λ i Pτ j
2≤nij
* (nij
*+1) . Then, we
have  nij*=   2/)/811( 2jiii PhK τλ++  where  x is  the  largest  integer  not  larger  than  x.
Nevertheless, if gij/gi > βi, the CRE is not eligible to the retailer due to the cost increase beyond
its internal tolerance. Conversely, if a retailer  i agrees with a CRE j, the supplier will offer a
price discount and an extra savings to satisfy  the inequality  djλiP+(1–Sj)gi > gij.  The least
discount offered by a CRE j acceptable to a retailer  i is given by ρij = {gij–(1–Sj)gi}/λiP; this
representation is similar to the one in Mishra (2004).
To  avoid  pre-segmenting  retailers  into  any  CRE,  cf.  Mishra’s  SD  model,  two  very  useful
indicators  are  introduced  to  conduct  the  following  analysis  toward  our  model. First,  let
γij ∈ {0,1} be the binary participation indicator for a retailer i to select a CRE j; γij = 1 indicates
that the selection is true, γij = 0, otherwise. Note that the retailer i must choose a CRE from Xw
or hold its own order interval; that is, the sum of decision variables γij over all j complies with
∑ j=1
w+1
γij=1 . The second indicator is the feasibility indicator αij = gi/gij–1/βi  for all i, j, where
x is the smallest integer not smaller than x; αij = 1 indicates that retailer i is eligible to select
a CRE j, i.e.,  gij/gi < βi,  αij = 0, otherwise. Notice that αi,w+1 = 1 for all  i since any retailer is
always feasible to hold its own order interval, i.e., gi,w+1 ≡ gi. In addition,these two indicators
jointly satisfy an equality 1
1
1
=γα∑ +
=
w
j ijij  for all the retailers.
3.3. General discount (GD) MCRE model
Now we are ready to define the first MCRE model in this paper, the GD MCRE Model. In  GD
model, every retailer is free to join a CRE as long as the minimum total cost of the supplier can
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be reached. The problem of the general discount (GD) MCRE model is to determine which
member of  Xw with corresponding τj,  dj utilized by all the retailers to minimize the supplier’s
total cost and can be formulated as follows:
Minimize ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑
=
+
= == =
+γ+



τ
+λγ+
τ
+

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 γ= m
i i
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i jij
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n
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1
1,
1 11 1
0 / , (1)
subject to d j≥αij γ ij ρij , ,...,wj,...,mi 1 and 1for == , (2)
1
1
1
=γα∑+
=
w
j
ijij , iwi gg =+1, , ,...,mi 1for = , (3)
{ }1,0∈γ ij , 11 and 1for +== ,...,wj,...,mi , (4)
{ } ww X∈ττ ,...,1 (5)
By utilizing (1), once the supplier decides which CREs are applied in Xw, the problem is simply
to  determine the optimal  MCRE scheme i.e.,  to  decide the values of  dj and  γij.  The  term
 mmi ij /1∑ = γ  in (1) is to detect whether or not a CRE j is utilized by any retailers. Employing
the participation indicators allows us to process all the w CREs simultaneously. The constraints
(2)~(5) allow GD to achieve minimum total  cost in (1) for all  the retailers with their best
choice of price discount under all the available CREs. Therefore, GD Model shall make a cost
improvement over the SD model in Mishra (2004).
Piplani and Viswanathan (2004) state that the models of Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) and
Mishra (2004) may overestimate the order processing cost per unit time of the supplier as
more than one CRE order occurs at the same time. By assuming a linear relationship of two
CREs, Piplani and Viswanathan offer a procedure with three factors to remove the problem of
order processing cost redundancy in the numerical  examples.  However, the redundancy of
order processing costs  G0 in (1) may hide the true optimal combination of the MCRE and
discounts from the optimal solutions.
3.4. Exact general discount (EGD) MCRE model
In modern retailing industry, a supplier often utilizes a distribution center to process retailers’
order, the cost including order-picking and consolidation processes should be considered as a
whole as long as the processes occur within a certain time frame.  As a consequence, the
supplier's relevant order processing costs may occur cost redundancy in GD model. The second
MCRE model defined in the study, EGD, is designed to remove redundancy of the joint order
processing cost in the GD model with a broader definition, and shall outperform the other
models to reach a better coordination. To alleviate the order processing cost redundancy of G0
in (1), first of all, we develop an exact formula to calculate the numbers of orders or of CRE
processed simultaneously at certain points of time. Thus, we are able to conclude how many
orders and CRE are processed during a certain period of time. 
-446-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.536
In a practical sense, each CRE can be represented by a rational number with a scale measured
in days, weeks, months, years, etc.; that is, all the elements in X are rational numbers. Based
on the characteristics of rational numbers, there exists a largest real number V for the set Xw
such that the ratio τj/V equals a positive integer lj for all j. All the orders released by a retailer i
selecting a CRE j will be placed at time interval nijτj, i.e., nijljV, in which V can be interpreted as
a unit length of all the CREs in Xw. Define an integer L as the least common multiplier of nijlj for
all i, j, and then the time epoch LV is able to cover all possible retailers’ orders based on any
CRE in Xw for at least one complete cycle. Furthermore, all the orders from the retailers joining
any CRE in Xw will be released at time kV, where k = 1,…, L. Observe that while the retailer i is
eligible to place an order at time  kV, some of the time  kV can be reached by  nijτj times a
positive integer such that the value of zijk = k/nijlj  –k/nijlj  either turns to 1, or turns to zero.
By considering with the participation indicator, γijzijk = 1 if and only if the retailer i selects a CRE
j and places an order at time kV; otherwise,  γijzijk = 0. Let  Zjk =  ∑i=1
m
γij zijk , which can be
interpreted as the number of orders released at time kV by all the retailers who select a CRE j.
Further, define Yjk = Zjk/m ; Yjk = 1 be a sign of at least one order released at time kV by all
the retailers who join a CRE j, and Yjk = 0, otherwise.
The roles of Yjk can be described by the following two dimensions. The first dimension is the
summation of Yjk over the CRE j, ∑
=
w
j jkY1 , which represents how many CREs in Xw having at
least one retailers’ order at time kV. Hence,  wYwj jk /1∑ =  = 1 indicates that there is at least
one  CRE  having  orders  at  time  kV,  and  ∑ j=1
w
Y jk /w  =  0, otherwise.  Thus,  define
 ∑ ∑
= =
=ϕ Lk
w
j jk LwY1 1 //  to represent the portion of  kV, where  k  = 1,…,L, having at least
one order from the retailers joining any CRE in Xw. As a result, for the time epoch LV, there are
Lϕ points of time having CRE orders with an order processing cost AS occurring at each time
point. Hence, the total order processing cost for CRE orders during time epoch LV is LϕAS, and
the total order processing cost per unit time is ϕAS /V.
The second dimension describing the roles of  Yjk is the summation of Yjk over the number k,
∑
=
L
k jkY1 , which represents how many points of time within time LV having orders based on
the CRE  j. Thus, define  ∑
=
=ϕ Lk jkj LY1 /  to represent the portion of  kV, where  k  = 1,…,L,
having at least one order from the retailers joining the CRE  j. As a result, for the time  LV,
there are  Lϕj points of time having orders from the CRE  j with an order processing cost  Aj
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occurring at each time point. Hence, the total order processing cost for CRE orders in Xw during
time LV is LϕjAj, and the total order processing cost per unit time is ϕjAj/V for all j.
The supplier’s total cost with savings of the overestimated order processing costs in (1) can be
revised as follows:
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Equation (6) is the total cost function of the Exact General Discount (EGD) MCRE model. The
definition  of  Yjk,  having orders  through a  particular  CRE at  a  certain  point  of  time,  is  to
formulate ϕj and ϕ as the portion of ordering occasions having orders through a particular CRE
and through any CRE in Xw, respectively. The explicit expressions of ϕj and ϕ in our model are
in contrast to Piplani and Viswanathan (2004). They use three factors to reach the same effect
of ϕ but with numerical expressions by examples, and do not consider an ordering processing
cost, such as  Aj, for an individual order within a CRE. Consequently, by substituting (6) into
(1), the EGD Model is definitely an improvement over the GD Model.
4. Numerical examples
Based on the development of our GD and EGD models, all the retailers have more freedom to
choose from a set of replenishment epochs than the SD model as long as the minimum total
cost of the supplier can be reached. Moreover, the cost redundancy for order processing is
removed in  EGD model  to  match up  with  the modern logistics  operations  in  the retailing
industry. The numerical examples developed in this section are to show the advantages of our
GD and EGD models over Mishra’s SD model. In addition, some managerial insights will also be
drawn from the numerical examples. Thus, we employ the numerical examples used in Mishra
(2004) with an identical set of fifteen retailers and various processing costs of the supplier. The
numerical examples can be referred to how a set of retailers efficiently participating various
subsets of distribution channels provided by the supplier with a set of replenishment epochs.
The methodologies for the retailers to decide their own subsets are restricted by SD, GD, and
EGD models.  The demands with the costs of order setup and holding of fifteen retailers are
shown in Table 1. The value ranges of processing costs of the supplier are Aj = 0, for all j, Ui
=10, 100, 200, 500, 1000 and Di = 10, 100, 200, 500, 1000, for all i, and AS = Ui or 3Ui. The
supplier’s preferable CRE set is  X (in weeks) = {1/7,3/7,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,10,11,12,13}.
The saving percentage  Sj is assumed to be 10% for any CRE. In Section 4.1, the numerical
results of GD and Mishra’s SD in a single CRE fashion will be shown. The numerical results
between EGD and SD in a multiple CRE fashion will be compared in Section 4.2.
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Retailer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Ki 50 50 150 50 150 100 500 500 1500 500 1500 1000 5000 3000 3000
λi (in mill.) 2 1 2 0.5 1 0.5 2 1 2 0.5 1 0.5 2 1 0.5
hi 0.15
Table 1. Data for retailers
4.1. CRE under general discount (GD) vs. selective discount (SD)
This subsection describes single CRE models, in which the supplier offers a set of time epochs
to all the retailers, and the retailers can only pick up a single time epoch. The objective of
models is to minimize the supplier's relevant cost. We term our GD model using (1) with βi = 2
for all  i as GD0, and GD0 without retailers’ choices as GD0N, i.e., 1/βi = 0, for all  i. We first
obtain the single CRE results of GD0N and GD0, and then compare with the results of Mishra’s
SD model in Table 2. The first columns of SD, GD0N and GD0 in Table 2 indicate the savings
(denoted as S% and D% denotes discount all through the paper)  over the situation with no
coordination. The second columns show the resulting CRE policies. The third column of GD0N
demonstrates the savings by excluding the retailers with retailers’ choice, and the number of
retailers excluded from the results of the second column. Table  2 shows that the savings of
GD0N are better than those of SD in 31 out of 50 examples, and the savings are the same for
the remaining 19 examples. When considering the retailers’ tolerance, 22 out 50 examples
have at least one retailer over its tolerance with GD0N, e.g., there are two retailers over their
individual tolerances in Ex30. By excluding those retailers out of these examples, the savings
drop a little bit, e.g., the savings of Ex30 decline from 36.4% to 28.3%. Now, by using model
GD0, we are able to increase the savings for all 22 examples, and 12 out of 22 examples even
have better savings than SD, e.g., the savings of Ex30 with GD0 is 28.3%, where that of SD is
only 25.1%.
The  numerical  results  in  this  subsection  show  that  by  relaxing  pre-segmentation  of  the
retailers in the SD model, GD0N offers more flexibility to each retailer to select a better CRE.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to see that GD0 may have less cost savings of the supplier
than GD0N since GD0 offers retailers’ considerations in their cost disadvantages. GD0 shall be
considered as a different model from GD0N; actually, GD0 incorporates the magnitude of the
cost disadvantage of the retailer joining a CRE.
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SD GD0N GD0
Ex AS Ui Di S(%)
CRE-
D(%)-
# Included
S(%)
CRE-D(%)-
# Included
S(%)-#
excluded from
previous
column
S(%)
CRE-D(%)-
# Included
1
10 10
10 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- -- --
2 100 0.8 2-0.07-3 5.5 2-0.11-2 -- -- --
3 200 6.2 2-0.11-5 12.0 3-0.23-3 -- -- --
4 500 15.4 3-0.23-10 25.1 4-0.36-6 17.3-1 22.4 3-0.23-6
5 1000 25.2 3-0.23-10 36.4 6-0.64-6 17.2-2 28.4 3-0.23-7
6
100 100
10 31.7 2-0.11-6 31.7 2-0.11-6 -- -- --
7 100 23.8 2-0.11-6 23.8 2-0.11-6 -- -- --
8 200 20.9 2-0.11-5 24.3 3-0.23-6 -- -- --
9 500 25.6 3-0.23-10 31.5 4-0.36-7 22.1-1 29.3 3-0.23-7
10 1000 30.0 3-0.23-10 39.1 6-0.64-6 18.6-2 31.8 3-0.23-7
11
200 200
10 48.6 2-0.12-8 48.6 2-0.12-8 -- -- --
12 100 38.7 2-0.12-8 38.7 2-0.12-8 -- -- --
13 200 32.9 2-0.12-8 36.0 3-0.23-9 -- -- --
14 500 33.9 3-0.23-10 37.1 4-0.36-7 26.1-1 35.5 3-0.23-8
15 1000 34.4 3-0.23-10 41.6 6-0.64-6 21.0-2 35.2 3-0.23-8
16
500 500
10 63.3 2-0.17-10 63.3 2-0.17-10 -- -- --
17 100 57.7 3-0.23-10 57.7 3-0.23-10 -- -- --
18 200 54.5 3-0.23-10 54.5 3-0.23-10 -- -- --
19 500 48.9 3-0.26-12 49.6 4-0.36-11 37.0-1 48.9 3-0.26-12
20 1000 45.4 4-0.36-14 49.6 6-0.64-10 26.7-2 44.5 3-0.26-12
21
1000 1000
10 74.7 3-0.26-12 74.7 3-0.26-12 -- -- --
22 100 71.5 3-0.26-12 71.5 3-0.26-12 -- -- --
23 200 68.6 3-0.26-12 68.6 3-0.26-12 -- -- --
24 500 62.0 3-0.26-12 62.6 4-0.36-12 46.7-1 62.0 3-0.26-12
25 1000 58.0 5-0.50-15 59.0 5-0.50-12 43.9-1 55.5 3-0.26-12
26
30 10
10 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- -- --
27 100 0.0 -- 3.7 2-0.11-2 -- -- --
28 200 5.3 2-0.11-5 11.4 3-0.23-3 -- -- --
29 500 15.1 3-0.23-10 24.9 4-0.36-6 17.1-1 22.2 3-0.23-6
30 1000 25.1 3-0.23-10 36.4 6-0.64-6 17.14-2 28.3 3-0.23-7
31
300 100
10 14.2 2-0.11-6 14.2 2-0.11-6 -- -- --
32 100 14.2 2-0.11-6 14.2 2-0.11-6 -- -- --
33 200 14.5 2-0.11-5 20.0 3-0.23-6 -- -- --
34 500 23.4 3-0.23-10 29.9 4-0.36-7 20.45-1 27.2 3-0.23-7
35 1000 28.8 3-0.23-10 38.5 6-0.64-6 18.00-2 30.6 3-0.23-7
36
600 200
10 30.2 2-0.12-8 30.2 2-0.12-8 -- -- --
37 100 25.8 2-0.12-8 27.8 3-0.23-8 -- -- --
38 200 26.4 3-0.23-10 29.6 3-0.23-8 -- -- --
39 500 30.2 3-0.23-10 34.3 4-0.36-7 23.31-1 31.8 3-0.23-8
40 1000 32.3 3-0.23-10 40.5 6-0.64-6 18.81-2 33.0 3-0.23-8
41 1500 500 10 49.1 3-0.23-10 49.1 3-0.23-10 -- -- --
42 100 47.0 3-0.23-10 47.0 3-0.23-10 -- -- --
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SD GD0N GD0
Ex AS Ui Di S(%)
CRE-
D(%)-
# Included
S(%)
CRE-D(%)-
# Included
S(%)-#
excluded from
previous
column
S(%)
CRE-D(%)-
# Included
43 200 45.3 3-0.23-10 45.3 3-0.23-10 -- -- --
44 500 42.4 3-0.26-12 44.8 4-0.36-11 32.19-1 42.4 3-0.26-12
45 1000 42.8 5-0.50-15 47.5 6-0.64-10 24.56-2 40.3 3-0.26-12
46
3000 1000
10 62.0 3-0.26-12 62.0 3-0.26-12 -- -- --
47 100 59.9 3-0.26-12 60.4 4-0.36-13 44.39-1 59.9 3-0.26-12
48 200 58.5 4-0.36-14 59.1 4-0.36-13 43.11-1 57.9 3-0.26-12
49 500 55.6 4-0.36-14 56.2 4-0.36-13 40.27-1 53.5 3-0.26-12
50 1000 54.2 5-0.50-15 55.5 6-0.64-11 29.65-2 49.1 3-0.26-12
Table 2. Numerical examples with single CRE
4.2. MCRE under general discount vs. exact general discount
The supplier offers a set of time epochs to all the retailers as described in subsection 4.1.
Similar to the condition that the supplier offers a set of time epochs to all the retailers, in this
subsection,  however,  any  retailer  can  pick  up  a  time  epoch  for  her  own as  long  as  the
supplier's relevant cost is minimized.  Considering the MCRE scheme, we present numerical
examples for a two-CRE problem. The result of seven examples with Ex 3, 8, 13, and 16~19
are compared as displayed in Table 3. Results in Table 3 show that GD0N has better savings
than SD in 4 out of 7 examples and equal values for the rest of 3 examples. Moreover, by
removing  the  redundancy  in  processing  costs  from  GD0N,  consider  (6)  without  retailers’
choices as EGDRN. EGDRN has better savings than GD0N and SD in all 7 examples. EGDRN,
GD0N and SD have impacts not only on the savings but also on the resulting CRE policies.
Table 3 also indicates the values of V, L, ϕ, ϕ1, and ϕ2 of the corresponding CREs in the second
column of EGDRN. The processing cost factor  for entire CRE orders plays an important role of
further savings; in contrast, the processing cost factors ϕ1, and ϕ2 for each CRE orders do not
affect the savings since we assume A1 = A2 = 0 in all the examples.
SD GD0N EGDRN
Ex
S
(%)
CRE - D(%)- 
# Included
S
(%)
CRE - D(%)- #
Included
S
(%)
CRE - D(%)- 
# Included
ϕ ϕ1 ϕ2 V L
3 6.2 2-0.11-5; 3-0.08-1 14.3 2-0.11-1; 3-0.17-2 14.6 2-0.11-2; 4-0.21-2 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
8 21.8 2-0.11-6; 4-0.14-3 26.4 2-0.11-3; 4-0.21-3 28.0 2-0.11-3; 4-0.21-3 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
13 33.4 2-0.11-5; 4-0.14-3 36.9 3-0.23-6; 4-0.17-3 37.9 2-0.12-3; 3-0.17-6 0.67 0.50 0.33 1 2520
16 65.1 2-0.12-8; 8-0.25-3 65.1 2-0.12-8; 8-0.25-3 67.5 2-0.12-8; 8-0.25-3 1.00 1.00 0.25 2 840
17 57.8 2-0.12-8; 8-0.25-3 57.8 2-0.12-8; 8-0.25-3 60.7 2-0.12-5; 4-0.25-6 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
18 54.6 3-0.23-10; 9-0.26-2 54.6 3-0.23-10; 9-0.26-2 56.5 2-0.12-4; 4-0.25-7 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
19 49.0 3-0.23-10; 9-0.26-2 51.5 4-0.36-6; 5-0.28-5 52.3 2-0.12-2; 4-0.36-9 0.50 0.50 0.50 2 840
Table 3. Numerical examples with two CREs
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Similar to the single-CRE problem with consideration for retailers’ tolerance, we set βi at either
2 or 1.5 for all the retailers of the examples in Table 3. As the results summarized in Table 4
indicate  Ex 13, 18 and 19 are the only 3 out of 7 examples affected by the given tolerance
limits. Furthermore, the effects are limited on GD0N model for all 3 examples and the effect on
EGDRN model occurs only for Ex19. Table 4 indicates that the impact of βi is not only on the
number of retailers joining CREs, but also on the choice of the CRE. For example, in CD0N of
Ex13 with  βi = 1.5, only a single CRE of  τ = 3 is selected even though there are two CREs
available. The impact of the tolerance limit may reduce the savings; however, the number of
retailers joining CREs may increase or decrease. For instance,  for EGDRN of  Ex19 without
retailers’ choices, there are 11 retailers to join CREs, with βi = 2, there are 12 retailers, and
with βi = 1.5, there are 10 retailers. The savings of GD0N and EGDRN with or without retailers’
tolerances for Ex19 are all better than the savings of SD. This indicates that GD0N and EGDRN
under  the  restriction  of  retailers’  choices  in  this  example  are  able  to  achieve  a  better
coordination than the SD.
GD0N EGDRN
Ex βi S
(%)
CRE - D(%)-
# Included
S (%) CRE - D(%)- # Included ϕ ϕ1 ϕ2 V L
13
2.0 36.9 3-0.23-6; 4-0.17-3 37.9 2-0.12-3; 3-0.17-6 0.67 0.50 0.33 1 2520
1.5 26.0 3-0.17-5; 4-0.14-3 37.9 2-0.12-3; 3-0.17-6 0.67 0.50 0.33 1 2520
18
2.0 54.6 3-0.23-10; 9-0.26-2 56.5 2-0.12-4; 4-0.25-7 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
1.5 40.3 3-0.20-9 56.5 2-0.12-4; 4-0.25-7 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
19
2.0 37.3 4-0.29-4; 5-0.27-5 51.2 2-0.17-4; 4-0.29-8 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
1.5 21.8 4-0.44-6; 5-0.28-6 50.2 2-0.12-4; 4-0.25-6 1.00 1.00 0.50 2 840
Table 4. Numerical Examples with two CREs and retailers’ choices
5. Concluding remarks
The contribution of this research is threefold. First, we propose a general MCRE model under
the criterion of minimizing the supplier’s total cost without pre-segmenting all or a portion of
the retailers into either one of the MCREs or none. Thus, our model can attain better savings
than the selective discount model, and reach a better coordination for the supplier. Secondly,
our general discount MCRE model further considers retailers’ choices based on the limits of
tolerance for the retailers. This mechanism allows the system to prevent any retailer’s cost
increase beyond its internal limit. Referring to the objective function in (1) with constraints
(2)~(4), our model can be easily modified to deal with the case of no retailers’ choices, by
defining the thresholds βi to a very large value such that αij = 1 for all the retailers and CREs.
In general, a higher tolerance will reach a higher savings. Third, by defining the unit length of
time for all the CREs, our model is able to incorporate additional processing costs Aj for single
CRE sets with an exact measurement, and our objective function in (6) extends Piplani and
Viswanathan’s model into a general formulation to alleviate order processing costs for entire
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CRE orders of the supplier. Moreover, if AS can be redefined as disregarding whether a retailer
joins the MCRE or not, this case can be accommodated by incorporating all  tj with all  τj, and
then determine joint  V and  L. Notice that the value of  Zjk represent the number of orders
placed through a CRE j at time kV. The order processing cost Aj for the CRE j can be further
extended from a constant to AS(Zjk) which is a function of the number of orders. 
All in all, this research delivers an Exact General Discount (EGD) MCRE model for a supplier to
coordinate the ordering and replenishment processes of a set of heterogeneous retailers. The
EGD model considers not only the minimization of the supplier’s cost, but also the retailers’
choices as well. The cost minimization in EDG helps the supplier reach a lower cost level than
most of the earlier works mentioned previously. The mechanism of incorporating the retailers’
choices in EGD allows the model to have a better fit into the retail industry where suppliers in
supply chains may not have exclusive power to control all their retailers. Nevertheless, our
model still has certain limitations, such as constant demand rates and instant replenishment
lead time. Future research may incorporate variations in demand or/and lead time.
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